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 1 Introduction
Worldwide environmental destruction has been attracting considerable attention. Obviously,
emissions from production and consumption (including disposal) activities are the major
causes of the environmental problems. When ﬁrms (consumers) generate emissions, the
conventional wisdom says that the government should intervene to restrict the production
(consumption). Emission taxes are typical policy measures for this purpose. The taxes
lower the level of production (consumption) and hence the negative externalities generated
by emissions are internalized.
In this age of globalization, however, production and consumption may not be done at
home. For example, by undertaking foreign direct investment (FDI), ﬁrms may not produce
in their own countries. Foreign production does not imply that the domestic country is free
from environmental damages. Transboundary pollution such as global warming, acid rain,
and depletion of ozone layer has lately been a big problem. When the good is produced
abroad, the domestic emission taxes are not eﬀective. In this case, it is often claimed that
t r a d ep o l i c i e ss u c ha st a r i ﬀss h o u l db eu s e dt oa ﬀect foreign production. Moreover, goods are
usually consumed not only at home but also abroad. That is, there usually exist multiple
markets. Thus, the framework of an open economy is indispensable to examine emission
regulations.
T h ep u r p o s eo ft h i sp a p e ri st os h e dl i g h to nt h ee ﬀects of taxes on emissions with
imperfect competition in the open economy. We focus on the case of monopoly in order
to obtain clear-cut results and policy implications. We show that emission taxes may be
less eﬀective than other taxes. In particular, an emission tax raises environmental damages
under certain circumstances. Thus, an easy application of the conventional wisdom in the
open economy framework should be discreet.
The basic structure of our model is as follows. There are two segmented markets, do-
mestic and foreign. A monopolist serves both markets but produces in either the domestic
country or the foreign country. Emissions are generated in the process of either production
or consumption and transboundary. To reduce emissions, the domestic government imposes
various taxes including emission taxes and trade taxes.
Our counter-intuitive result stems from the spillover eﬀects between the markets which
are caused by non-constant marginal cost (MC).1 As long as the MC is constant, a tax in
the domestic country aﬀects only domestic market. Thus, the eﬀects of the tax are basically
the same as those in the closed economy. If the MC is not constant, on the other hand, the
diﬀerent markets are connected through the changes of the MC.
Intuition behind our results are somewhat similar to that under plant relocation. When
the domestic government adopts tough environmental regulations, domestic ﬁrms may shift
1 For recent studies on trade policies with spillover eﬀects, see Ishikawa and Mukunoki (2004).
1their plants abroad.2 If emission regulations are loose enough abroad, for example, envi-
ronmental damages could become worse as a result of the plant relocation. Instead of such
plant relocation, in our model, the single-plant monopolist adjusts its supplies between two
markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3, respectively, examine
the case of domestic production and the case of foreign production. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 Production in the Domestic Country
We consider an industry in which a monopolist produces a good with a single domestic plant
and serves both domestic and foreign markets. These two markets are segmented and hence
the monopolist can set diﬀerent prices across the markets. The inverse demand functions
are given by
p = P(x); P






where x and p are the demand and consumer price of the good in the domestic market.
Foreign variables, parameters and functions are denoted by “∗”. We deﬁne the elasticity of
the slope of the inverse demand function ²(x) ≡− xP00(x)/P 0(x) for the following analysis.
The (inverse) demand curve is concave if ²(x) ≤ 0 and convex if ²(x) ≥ 0.
In this section, we assume that the monopolist produces in the domestic country. Pro-
duction or consumption generates emissions which lead to negative externalities. Emissions
measured in the domestic country are given by ω ≡ ez + ke∗z∗ where e, e∗,a n dk are pa-
rameters with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. k is the degree of transboundary emissions. z is the domestic
output level (i.e., z = x+x∗ and z∗ =0 ) if production generates emissions and the domestic
consumption level (i.e., z = x and z∗ = x∗) if consumption generates emissions. Domestic
negative externalities are measured by B(ω); B0 > 0 with B(0) = 0. The domestic govern-
ment sets various speciﬁc taxes to control emissions: an emission tax, t, a production tax,
ν, a consumption tax, θ,a n da ne x p o r tt a x ,ζ.
The proﬁt of the monopolist is
Π(x,x
∗;t,ν,θ,ζ)=[ P(x) − θ − ν]x +[ P
∗(x
∗) − ζ − ν]x
∗ − C(x + x
∗) − tez, (2)
where C(·) is the cost function with C0 > 0.
2 See Markusen et al. (1993,1995) and Raucscher (1995), for example.
22.1 Emission Taxes
We ﬁrst examine emission taxes when production leads to negative externalities. Noting
z = x + x∗,t h eﬁrst-order conditions for the monopolist are
∂Π
∂x
=( P − θ − ν)+P
0x − (C
0 + te)=0 , (3)
∂Π
∂x∗ =( P




0 + te)=0 . (4)















































The following should be noted. First, in view of (5) and (6), ²<2 and ²∗ < 2 are
necessary when C
00 ≤ 0. Second, the slope of the domestic MR curve is given by P0(2 − ²).
Third, it can be seen from the second-order conditions that if ² ≥ 2, then ²∗ < 2 is necessary
and vice versa. Therefore, the following lemma is straightforward:
Lemma 1. (i) ²>2 or ²∗ > 2 holds only if C0+te is increasing. (ii) The domestic (foreign)
MR curve is downward-sloping if and only if ²<2( ²∗ < 2). (iii) The MR curve can be
upward-sloping or horizontal at most in one country.
To analyze the eﬀects of the domestic emission tax on emissions, setting ν = θ = ζ =0 ,
we totally diﬀerentiate (3) and (4) and obtain
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P0(2 − ²)+P∗0(2 − ²∗)
Ω
e. (8)
3In view of Lemma 1, the following are straightforward. If C
00 ≤ 0,b o t h²<2 and ²∗ < 2
hold and hence an increase in t necessarily decreases both x and x∗.I fC
00 > 0,o nt h eo t h e r
hand, x (x∗) increases if and only if ²∗ > 2 (²>2). However, it can be shown with the aid
of Figures 1 and 2 that the total supply decreases even if either ²>2 or ²∗ > 2 holds.
[Figure 1 and 2 around here]
In the ﬁgures, RR and R∗R∗, respectively, show the locus of the ﬁrst-order condition (3)
and (4) on the quantity plane. The initial equilibrium, E, is given by the intersection of RR














P∗0(2 − ²∗) − C
00. (10)
Since the numerator of (9) and the denominator of (10) are negative from the second-order
conditions, the signs of the slopes depend only on the sign of C
00. While RR is vertical
and R∗R∗ is horizontal with C
00 =0 , both loci are downward-sloping (upward-sloping) with
C
00 > 0 (C
00 < 0). The second-order conditions imply that RR is steeper than R∗R∗.T h e
absolute value of the slope of RR (R∗R∗) is greater (less) than 1 if and only if ²<2( ²∗ < 2).
Figure 1 illustrates the case where both ²<2 and ²∗ < 2 hold, while Figure 2 shows the
case where ²<2 and ²∗ > 2 hold.
An increase in t shifts both RR and R∗R∗ downward. Suppose that RR (R∗R∗)s h i f t s
downward to R0R0 (R∗0R∗0) in Figure 1. Then the equilibrium moves from E to E
0 which
must be located in the southwest of E, because both x and x∗ fall. In Figure 2, the new
equilibrium E
0 must be located to the southeast of E,b e c a u s ex increases while x∗ decreases.
Noting R∗R∗ and hence RR are steeper than the 45 degree line, the total output at E
0 is
less than that at E.
It is somewhat puzzling that an increase in t could raise x (x∗) and its condition depends
on the foreign (domestic) demand (i.e., ²∗(²)). The intuition is as follows. Suppose that
C
00 > 0 and ²∗ > 2.A ni n c r e a s ei nt decreases x∗. The decrease in x∗ is much larger under
the upward-sloping MR curve in the foreign country, i.e., ²∗ > 2, than under the downward-
sloping MR curve, i.e., ²∗ < 2.3 This eﬀect is large enough to make C0 + te lower, which
actually dominates the original increase in t.A sar e s u l t ,x rises, but since x∗ falls by a large
amount, x + x∗ lowers.
The above analysis establishes the following proposition.
3 This can easily be veriﬁed in Figure 2.
4Proposition 1. Suppose that a monopolist produces its product in the domestic country and
serves both domestic and foreign markets and that production generates emissions. Then an
increase in the domestic emission tax necessarily reduces the total emissions in the domestic
country. If one of the MR curves is upward-sloping, however, the eﬀect is mitigated.
Next we investigate emission taxes when consumption generates emissions. Since z = x
and z∗ = x∗,t h eﬁrst-order conditions are modiﬁed as follows:
∂Π
∂x
=( P − θ − ν)+P
0x − (C
0 + te)=0 , (11)
∂Π
∂x∗ =( P














































An increase in t lowers x.W h e t h e rx∗ decreases or not depends on the sign of C
00.W h e n
C
00 > 0, x∗ increases. This is because a decrease in the supply to the domestic market caused
by an emission tax reduces the MC of production and hence the monopolist has an incentive
to increase the supply to the other market, i.e., the foreign market. If ²∗ > 2 in addition to
C
00 > 0, the total output increases.4 However, if ²∗ < 2, the total output falls.
We can conﬁrm the above result in Figures 1 and 2. When t rises, only RR shifts
downward. In Figure 1, the new equilibrium is at E
00.W h e r e a sx falls, x∗ rises. Since R∗R∗
is less steep than 45 degree line, the total output necessarily lowers. In Figure 2, on the
other hand, the new equilibrium is given by a.S i n c eR∗R∗ is steeper than the 45 degree line,
the total output necessarily rises.
We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a monopolist produces its product in the domestic country and
serves both domestic and foreign markets and that consumption generates emissions. If the
MC curve is upward-sloping, an increase in the domestic emission tax lowers the domestic
emissions but raises the foreign ones, which may increase negative externalities measured in
the domestic country.
Next we examine the eﬀects of emission taxes on domestic welfare. Domestic welfare is
4 From the second-order condition, C
00
> 0 is necessary when ²∗ > 2.
5measured by sum of the consumer surplus (CS), proﬁts, tax revenue, and negative external-
ities measured in the domestic country:5
W = CS(x)+Π(x,x
∗;t,ν,θ,ζ)+tez + ν(x + x
∗)+θx + ζx
∗ − B(ez + ke
∗z
∗). (14)
We ﬁrst consider the case where production generates emissions. Setting ν = θ = ζ =0 ,












Evaluating (15) at t =0 , we can obtain the eﬀect of introducing an emission tax:
dW
dt











Since d(x + x∗)/dt < 0, an emission tax enhances domestic welfare if dx/dt > 0 (i.e.,
²∗ > 2).7 Intuitively, under monopoly, the domestic market is undersupplied. Thus, if an
increase in the supply as well as a reduction of the total emissions are realized, domestic
welfare improves. If dx/dt < 0 (i.e., ²∗ < 2), however, the welfare loss caused by the reduction
of the domestic supply may outweigh the welfare gain from the reduction of the emissions.
In the case where consumption generates emissions, setting ν = θ = ζ =0 , z = x and
z∗ = x∗ we diﬀerentiate domestic welfare (14) with respect to t and evaluate it at t =0 :
dW
dt














the sign of which is generally ambiguous. If e(dx/dt)+e∗(dx∗/dt) > 0, which holds only
when C
00 > 0, then an emission tax deteriorates domestic welfare. An emission tax improves
domestic welfare only if the welfare gain from the reduction of negative externalities exceeds
the welfare loss caused by the reduction of the domestic consumption.
2.2 Other Taxes
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that emission taxes may not be very eﬀective to reduce negative
externalities. In the following, we examine the eﬀects of the other taxes. First of all, the
following should be noted. The eﬀects of an emission tax are qualitatively the same with
those of a production or consumption tax. In particular, an emission tax becomes equivalent
5 If the monopolistic ﬁrm is foreign owned, we need to take into account the rent-shifting eﬀect from the
foreign monopolist to the domestic country. For details, see Ishikawa (2000).
6 An emission tax is harmful to the monopolist.
7 (dW/dt)|t=0 > 0 implies that the optimal emission tax is positive.





























































Ar i s eo fζ decreases x∗, increases x if and only if C
00 > 0, and reduces x + x∗ if and only if
²<2. Noting that only R∗R∗ shifts downward with an increase in ζ, it is straightforward to
conﬁr mt h er e s u l ti nF i g u r e s1a n d2 .T h ee ﬀects of these taxes are summarized in Tables
1, 2 and 3.
[Tables 1, 2 and 3 around here]
If domestic consumption and exports are jointly taxed at the same level (i.e., θ = ζ),
this gives rise to the same eﬀects as an equal tax on domestic production. Thus, in the case
of production externalities, a production tax is more eﬀective than a consumption or export
t a xa sl o n ga sb o t h²<2 and ²∗ < 2 hold. However, if this is not the case, a consumption
tax or an export tax is more eﬀective. Therefore, a consumption (an export) tax may be
more eﬀective than an emission tax if ²>2 ( ²∗ > 2).
In the case of consumption externalities, a production tax or an export tax may be more
eﬀective than an emission tax. If both ²<2 and ²∗ < 2 hold, a production tax lowers
consumption in both countries and hence necessarily decreases negative externalities. If
C
00 < 0, an export tax decreases consumption in both countries. If C
00 > 0,a ne x p o r t
tax reduces foreign emissions but raises the domestic ones. If the foreign reduction is large
enough, the total negative externalities in the domestic country become smaller.
We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When production generates emissions, an increase in the consumption (ex-
port) tax reduces the total emissions if the foreign (domestic) MR curve is downward-sloping
a n dh e n c em a yb em o r ee ﬀective than that of an emission tax. When consumption generates
emissions, an increase in the production tax decreases the total emissions if both domestic
and foreign MR curves are downward-sloping and hence may be more eﬀective than that of
the emission tax.
73 Production in the Foreign Country
In this section, we examine the case where the monopolist is producing in the foreign country.
We speciﬁcally analyze the eﬀects of an import tariﬀ, τ, imposed by the domestic government.
The proﬁt of the monopolist is modiﬁed as follows
Π(x,x






where C∗(·) is the cost function when producing abroad. The ﬁrst-order conditions become
∂Π
∂x
=( P − τ)+P
0x − C







∗0 =0 . (23)




































2 > 0. (26)




















where Ω∗ ≡ (2P0 + P00x − C
∗00)(2P∗0 + P∗00x∗ − C
∗00) − (C
∗00)2 > 0. Thus, the eﬀects of a



















At a r i ﬀ necessarily decreases the domestic imports, but decreases the total output if and
only if ²∗ < 2.8 Thus, as long as ²∗ > 2, tariﬀsa r ei n e ﬀective to reduce negative externalities
generated by production. Furthermore, in the case of consumption externalities, a tariﬀ
raises the foreign consumption and hence foreign emissions when C
∗00 > 0.I f t h i s e ﬀect is
8 As one may expect, the eﬀects are similar to those of consumption taxes in the last section. The only
diﬀerence is the cost functions. As long as the good is produced only abroad, tariﬀsa r ee q u i v a l e n tt o
consumption taxes if their rates are the same, i.e., τ = θ.M o r e o v e r ,t h e e ﬀects of an emission tax in
the case of consumption externalities are qualitatively the same with those of a tariﬀ.
8strong enough, a tariﬀ raises negative externalities in the domestic country.
We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When emissions are generated by production, an increase in the import
tariﬀ lowers the total emissions if and only if the foreign MR curve is downward-sloping.
When emissions are generated by consumption, an increase in the tariﬀ always lowers the
domestic emissions but raises the foreign emissions if and only if the foreign MC curve is
upward-sloping.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have examined whether various taxes such as emission taxes reduce emissions in an
open economy. It has been shown that emission taxes may not be very eﬀective to reduce
negative externalities. The shapes of the MR and MC curves are the key to our results. The
upward-sloping MR curve particularly plays a crucial role.
Although one may think that the increasing MR is peculiar, it has been recognized by a
number of studies as an important possibility.9 These works show that the conditions giving
rise to the upward-sloping MR curve are not stringent: any convex demand function that is
consistent with the law of demand can have upward-sloping MR curve (see Formby et al.,
1982). In addition, Walters (1980) shows the evidence of positively sloping marginal revenue
i nt h ep r i c i n go ft h eP o r to fS i n g a p o r e . T h e s esuggest that there should be no theoretical
and empirical reasons that rule out the possibility of upward MR curve, and, in fact, new
results have been obtained by incorporating the possibility in various topics such as dual
equilibria in monopolistic competition (Ireland, 1984), cartel and anti-trust (Smith et al.,
1987), and third-degree price discrimination (Nahata et al., 1990).
To make our point as clearly as possible, we have presented a monopoly model. It is
also possible to extend our analysis to an oligopoly framework. For example, introducing
local ﬁrms into our model, we can still verify the existence of a Cournot equilibrium without
declining MR and obtain similar results as long as the local ﬁrms serve only their own
markets.
9 A classical work by Robinson (1933) pointed out the possilbility and its importance. However, it was
in 1980’s when the analysis of upward-sloping MR curve was actually developed. See Formby et al.
(1982), Coughlin (1984), Beckman and Smith (1993), for example. In particular, using the elasticity of
the slope of the demand curve, Coughlin (1984) shows that the MR function is increasing with respect
to quantity if and only if the value of the elasticity is greater than two.
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10Table 1
Eﬀects of production tax
²<2,² ∗ < 2 ²>2,² ∗ < 2 ²<2,² ∗ > 2
x − − +
x∗ − + −
x + x∗ − − −
Table 2
Eﬀects of consumption tax
²<2,² ∗ < 2 ²>2,² ∗ < 2 ²<2,² ∗ > 2
x − − −





x + x∗ − − +
Table 3
Eﬀects of export tax
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Figure 2: ¡00 > 0;² < 2 and ²¤ > 2